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Trade and the Competitiveness Agenda
José Guilherme Reis and Thomas Farole
Export-Led Growth, the Crisis, and the End 
of an Era
The dramatic expansion in global trade over recent decades
has contributed significantly to diversification, growth, and
poverty reduction in many developing countries. This period
of rapid export growth has been enabled by two critical
structural changes in global trade: (1) the vertical and spatial
fragmentation  of  manufacturing  into  highly  integrated
“global production networks,” and (2) the rise of services
trade and the growth of “offshoring.” Both of these, in turn,
were made possible by major technological revolutions; and
they were supported by multilateral trade policy reforms
and broad liberalizations in domestic trade and investment
environments worldwide.
The global economic crisis came crashing into the middle
of this long-running export-led growth party during 2008
and 2009. Between the last quarter of 2007 and the second
quarter of 2009, global trade contracted by 36 percent. But
as the recovery started to strengthen in 2010 (at least until
the clouds began to form over Europe), the longer-term im-
pacts of the crisis on the policy environment regarding trade
and growth were becoming more apparent. Indeed, in addi-
tion to raising concerns over the global commitment to trade
liberalization, the crisis has also led to some serious rethink-
ing  of  some  of  the  conventional  wisdom  regarding  the
growth agenda—the most important result of which is the
likelihood that governments will play a much more activist
role in the coming years. There are three principal reasons
why governments are likely to be more actively involved in
industrial and trade policy in the coming years. 
First, the crisis has undone faith in markets and discred-
ited laissez-faire approaches that rely simply on trade policy
liberalization. Instead, governments and local markets have
been “rediscovered.” In this sense, the demand for activist
government is likely to go well beyond financial markets and
regulation, and it will affect the policy environment in which
trade and industrial strategies are designed.
Second, the crisis has highlighted the critical importance
of diversification (of sectors, products, and trading partners)
in reducing the risks of growth volatility. The recent era of
globalization contributed to substantial specialization of
The global economic crisis has forced a major rethinking of the respective roles of governments and markets in the
processes of trade and growth. Indeed, industrial policy seems to be back in fashion—or, at least, talking about it is.
But a renewed “activism” by government in the trade and growth agenda need not mean a return to old-style
policies of import substitution and “picking winners.” Instead, it may mean a stronger focus on competitiveness by
unlocking the constraints to private sector–led growth. This note discusses the renewed role of government in trade
and growth policy from the competitiveness angle, and it suggests some priorities for the new competitiveness agenda.
Decomposing the Effects of CCTs on Entrepreneurship
Guilherme Lichand
This note assesses whether Bolsa-Família increases the probability of starting a venture in Brazil by decomposing its potential 
effects into three channels: wealth-constraint alleviation, insurance provision, and reduction of children’s labor supply 
(through the effect of the conditionality). Results are that entrepreneurship is indeed stimulated by Bolsa-Família in urban 
areas through the insurance and wealth-constraint alleviation effects, notwithstanding that new ventures are typically 
secondary sources of income. The conditionality seems not to impact the level of entrepreneurship. Hence, Bolsa-Família 
might have a positive long-term effect as well, instead of just offering short-term poverty relief.
Over the last decade, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs 
significantly  reduced  poverty  and  inequality  in  developing 
countries. In particular, Brazil’s CCT program, Bolsa-Família, 
along with other governmental transfers, has been credited for 
reducing inequality by as much as 50 percent (Barros 2007; 
Gini index decreased from 0.5957 in 2001 to 0.5431 in 2009, 
according  to  Getulio  Vargas  Foundation’s  Center  for  Social 
Policies (CPS/FGV). However, potential effects of the program 
on entrepreneurship have not yet been assessed.
Government support of income-generating activities among 
poor individuals is such an important policy area that Ricardo 
Paes de Barros, one of the top poverty economists in Brazil, calls 
it the next generation of social protection policies in the coun-
try, and the recently concluded presidential campaign intro-
duced the idea of “expanding Bolsa-Família to include money 
targeted to increasing household savings.”1 
Whether the program enables poor individuals to start their 
own ventures is particularly relevant in light of the claim—com-
mon to all CCTs—that Bolsa-Família provides short-term pov-
erty relief without helping the poor acquire the necessary tools 
for breaking away from poverty on their own. If the program is 
to  have  a  positive  effect  on  entrepreneurship,  this  concern 
should be addressed. 
Through Bolsa-Família, households up to a certain income 
threshold and with children or pregnant women receive gov-
ernmental transfers as long as they meet some requirements 
related to investments in children’s human capital. Created in 
2003, the program is designed to target the poorest families in 
the country, has displayed targeting and coverage performance 
above any national program, and is in line with best interna-
tional practices.
There is now a large literature that documents the mecha-
nisms through which CCTs affect individual decisions. Bolsa-
Família is reported to affect school attendance and the labor 
supply of children (Cardoso and De Souza 2004, for Bolsa-Es-
cola, which was later on merged with other—unconditional—
cash transfers to originate Bolsa-Família), but not to impact 
parents’ labor supply (Medeiros, Britto, and Soares 2008) nor 2  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK  	 	 www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
induce strategic fertility decisions (Rocha and Soares 2010). As 
for the effects on entrepreneurship, it has already been shown 
that Mexico’s Oportunidades increases the income-generating 
potential of poor families (Gertler, Martinez, and Rubio-Codi-
na 2007), and the assessment of other programs such as Pro-
campo, also in Mexico, and a microfinance experiment in India 
also point toward a positive effect of transfers on start-ups for 
potentially wealth-constrained families (Sadoulet, de Janvry, 
and Davis 2001; Ravallion and Chen 2005). 
If start-up costs are substantial, and if poor individuals have 
limited access to credit, CCTs are expected to increase entrepre-
neurship  through  the  wealth-constraint  alleviation  channel, 
because  wealth-constrained  individuals  could  use  the  cash 
transfer to start a new venture or to increase the scale of their 
pre-existing firm. Moreover, if household heads are risk averse, 
CCTs are also expected to increase entrepreneurship through 
the insurance provision channel: because they are guaranteed 
to receive the transfer irrespective of what happens with their 
business,2 from success to bankruptcy, individuals could be 
more willing to engage in risky activities. Taking as given that 
children always work with their parents, CCTs should decrease 
entrepreneurship through a third channel: if the conditionality 
decreases children’s labor supply and if children were more pro-
ductive “inside” the firm, starting a venture becomes less attrac-
tive to parents, since they cannot rely on their children’s sup-
port to the same extent as before.
This assessment draws upon National Household Surveys 
(Pesquisas Nacionais de Amostras de Domicílios, PNADs) for 
2004 and 2006, the only years that identify transfer beneficia-
ry households. The empirical strategy to separate the effects of 
interest is to compare individuals based on their wealth prior to 
the transfer for the first channel; on their wealth after the transfer 
for the second channel; and on their children’s gender for the 
third channel, since it has been documented that the condi-
tionality is only binding for boys in what comes to reducing 
children’s labor supply (Cardoso and De Souza 2004).3 There-
fore, if the effect of Bolsa-Família on entrepreneurship is condi-
tional on children’s gender, then the conditionality has a level 
effect.
Because wealth is not perfectly observed on PNADs, it is 
proxied through asset ownership and current income. While 
income coming from the transfer is the fundamental variable 
for the definition of ex ante and ex post wealth, it can only be 
used as a control on the occupational choice equation since the 
program is documented not to affect parent’s extensive or in-
tensive margin labor decisions (Medeiros, Britto, and Soares 
2008).4
Tables 1 and 2 present the main results. Entrepreneurship 
(defined as owning a business as an employer or self-employed) 
is indeed stimulated by the program, but only in urban areas, 
through  the  insurance  and  wealth-constraint  alleviation  ef-
fects, and accounting for the fact that new ventures are typical-
ly secondary sources of income. The conditionality does not 
impact the level of entrepreneurship. When interacted with 
house ownership, the program is documented to have a smaller 
impact among those household heads who own their houses—
reinforcing the interpretation of wealth-constraint alleviation; 
however, this effect is not statistically significant, probably be-
cause the survey’s question is not really about legal tenure.
Recipient household heads use the cash transfers to diversi-
fy their income portfolio; this can also be regarded as a positive 
effect of the program, because it can enhance the ability of the 
poor to protect themselves against economic shocks. Also of 
note is the fact that Bolsa-Família is different from other trans-
fers in what comes to providing insurance, what is reasonable 
given that program’s cash transfer stands, in many cases, for a 
large share of poor households’ income.5 
Alternative explanations for these effects, such as the fact 
that that enrolled individuals might also have higher social cap-
ital  or  a  higher  unobserved  tendency  for  entrepreneurship, 
seem to be dismissed by a composition effect: the increased pro-
pensity to start a venture comes entirely from self-employment, 
Table 1. Main Occupation, Urban Subsample
  Wealth-constraint alleviation (IV)  Insurance (OLS)
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
  entrepreneur  employer  self-employed  entrepreneur  employer  self-employed
Bolsa-Família  0.00435  -0.00532***  0.00967*  0.00689  -0.00517***  0.0121**
   (0.0055)  (0.0017)  (0.0054)  (0.0055)  (0.0017)  (0.0054)
Other transfers  -0.00719  -0.00433**  -0.00286  -0.00526  -0.00421**  -0.00105
   (0.0058)  (0.0018)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0018)  (0.0057)
Individual controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Observations  49,588  49,588  49,588  49,588  49,588  49,588
R-squared  0.06  0.024  0.056  0.06  0.024  0.057
Source: Compiled by author. 
Notes: OLS = ordinary least squares. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. (IV) uses ex ante income as an instrumental variable for ex post 
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while there seems to be some transitioning from employers to 
self-employment. Whether this points to the effect of the bind-
ing conditionality—through parents sending their children to 
school instead of working in their business—or to the misre-
porting of parents—afraid of losing benefits because they kept 
their children working in the business—is not relevant for this 
analysis: what matters is that higher social capital or a higher 
unobserved predisposition to start a venture cannot account 
for this effect.
The previous findings lead to the conclusion that Bolsa-
Família stimulates self-employment; if this is regarded as a high-
er-productivity activity, then it would be tempting to conclude 
that  the  program  might  have  positive  long-term  effects  on 
growth, in addition to short-term poverty relief, and better pro-
tection against shocks as a result of enhanced diversification of 
the household income portfolio. The program’s effects on indi-
vidual’s occupational choices are concentrated in urban areas, 
precisely where the Bolsa-Família has been identified as having 
weaker potential to support individuals out of poverty through 
“first-order” effects, that is, by allowing increased access to basic 
services and goods.6 
When the activity composition for those individuals allocat-
ed to self-employment in secondary sources of income is investi-
gated, it shows that they are mainly involved in small-scale com-
merce and service ventures, activities that are better suited to 
urban markets and, hence, might involve lower start-up costs 
when compared to those in rural environments. In fact, the 
wealth-constraint alleviation effect is stronger for activities with 
higher start-up costs, which confirms the interpretation that it 
is the program that increases the likelihood of engaging in a 
start-up, and not the opposite. Breaking up activities by com-
merce and services, it turns out that the positive effect on entre-
preneurship comes entirely from services, what can be recon-
ciled with the higher start-up costs for services, since small-scale 
commerce is often carried out through consignation—meaning 
that unsold goods can be returned to the supplier at no charge to 
the seller—while service provision typically involves acquiring 
tools or inputs that require upfront payments. 
It is also worth remarking that negative effects of the pro-
gram on entrepreneurship due to the conditionality were not 
found, either because children’s productivity is not higher in-
side  parents’  firm  or  because  children  actually  do  not  stop 
working in parents’ ventures. Had negative effects been found, 
that could bear implications for CCT bundle’s redesign if gov-
ernment considers reformulating the program to further stim-
ulate entrepreneurship. It turns out that this short- versus long-
term  productivity  trade-off  (because  enrolled  children  are 
more likely to end up as better educated adults, with a higher 
tendency  toward  entrepreneurial  activities)  does  not  exist 
when it comes to the program’s conditionality.
Taking stock, entrepreneurship is indeed stimulated by Bol-
sa-Família through the insurance and wealth-constraint allevia-
tion effects, recalling that new ventures are typically secondary 
sources of income. Conditionality does not impact the level of 
entrepreneurship.  Recipient  household  heads  use  the  cash 
transfer to diversify their income portfolio; this can also be re-
garded as positive effect of the program because it can enhance 
the ability of the poor to protect themselves against economic 
shocks. Moreover, it is relevant that this effect is concentrated 
in urban areas, where Bolsa-Família’s first-order effect, that of 
reducing current poverty, has been shown to be less successful 
than in rural areas. 
Hence, Bolsa-Família might have a positive long-term effect, 
instead of just offering short-term poverty relief. Also of inter-
est is the fact that individuals regard Bolsa-Família as different 
from other transfers in what comes to insurance provision, at 
least to the extent they take them into account in their occupa-
tional choice. Finally, the fact that no negative effects of the pro-
gram on entrepreneurship as a result of the conditionality were 
found supports the claim that there is no short- versus long-
term productivity trade-off linked to program’s requirements 
of investment in children’s human capital.
Table 2. All Sources of Income, Urban Subsample
  Wealth-constraint alleviation (IV)  Insurance (OLS)
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
  entrepreneur  employer  self-employed  entrepreneur  employer  self-employed
Bolsa-Família  0.00319**  -0.000158  0.00334***  0.00307**  -0.00017  0.00324***
   (0.0013)  (0.0003)  (0.0012)  (0.0013)  (0.0003)  (0.0012)
Other transfers  0.00400***  -0.000098  0.00410***  0.00391***  -0.000107  0.00402***
   (0.0013)  (0.0003)  (0.0013)  (0.0013)  (0.0003)  (0.0013)
Individual controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Observations  49,588  49,588  49,588  49,588  49,588  49,588
R-squared  0.006  0.004  0.005  0.006  0.004  0.005
Source: Compiled by author. 
Notes: OLS = ordinary least squares. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. (IV) uses ex ante income as an instrumental variable for ex post 
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Notes
1. Michel Temer, Brazil’s next vice-president, in an interview 
with Valor Econômico July, 21, 2010.
2.  Unless a firm’s profits were so high as to eliminate household 
eligibility to the program, a situation ruled out for this assess-
ment without great loss of generality.
3. Ex post wealth differs from ex ante wealth by revenues from 
interest, financial applications, and other sources of income 
(this is the best allowed by PNAD). It is assumed that poor indi-
viduals do not have financial applications or control for recipi-
ent status of other government transfers.
4. Results for the effects of the program without including in-
come on the right hand side of the equation (and thus, without 
decomposing its effect on entrepreneurship) are still very posi-
tive and significant.
5. Calculations indicate that Bolsa-Família represents about 10 
percent of a recipient’s average household income, and up to 50 
percent of the average income of those households in the lowest 
income decile among recipients.
6. “How to get children out of jobs and into school,” The Econo-
mist, July 29, 2010.
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